



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STAFF NOTES:

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

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USSR and East Germany Sign Friendship Treaty

The 25-year friendship treaty signed by the Soviet Union and East Germany on Tuesday is another attempt by Moscow to legitimize the division of Germany and to justify Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. It may serve as a model for the future revision of corresponding treaties with other East European states.

The new agreement replaces a 20-year accord signed in 1964 that was to remain in effect unless a German peace treaty was signed or Germany was reunited. The Soviets clearly believe that the Helsinki agreement is a surrogate for a German peace treaty. Moreover, both the new friendship treaty and Brezhnev's remarks preceding its signature make plain that the European status quo is now considered frozen and that any possibility for German reunification, peaceful or otherwise, is out of the question. References in the treaty to East Germany as a "sovereign, independent state" reflect both sides' desire that East Germany's enhanced status be internationally recognized.

The treaty also includes language that asserts the responsibility of all socialist countries to support, strengthen, and defend "socialist gains." This language was used to justify the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia and has come to be known as the "Brezhnev doctrine." By their selection of these words, the Soviets are telling the East Europeans that there will be no fundamental change in their relationship with the USSR as a consequence of Helsinki.

The Soviets may also have been trying to reassure the East Germans that they need not fear the consequences of progress at the Vienna force reduction talks. The Vienna talks were discussed when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Prague and East Berlin in late September, and East Berlin's coolness

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to force reductions was evident from its failure to follow Prague in specifically endorsing Soviet efforts. Differences also cropped up during Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's talks with his East German counterpart in Moscow immediately after the Gromyko trip. The East German insisted that until "military detente" is reached, the socialist community's military strength must be increased. Recognition of East German security needs was also stressed by Honecker and his fellow travelers in Moscow, although Honecker did let slip a qualified endorsement of the limitation, but not reduction, of military forces in Central Europe.

At the same time, the citation of the Brezhnev doctrine and the great stress on across-the-board cooperation in the treaty may be intended by Brezhnev to quiet fears within the Soviet leadership that the Helsinki final act and the Vienna force reduction talks will undermine Moscow's grip on Eastern Europe. In an article in *Kommunist* released on the eve of the Honecker visit, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko clearly stated that Moscow will raise the degree of its cohesion with Eastern Europe to still higher levels. If the new treaty with East Germany is intended as a vehicle for reaching this goal, invitations to the Czechoslovaks, Poles, and other East Europeans to sign similar accords may be in the offing.

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Soviet Propaganda on Spain

The Soviets have taken advantage of the strong Western reaction to the executions in Spain to mount a vehement propaganda campaign of their own against the Franco regime.

The Soviets have also begun to accuse the US of guilt by association, although they have cloaked their criticism by citing foreign commentary. *Izvestia* on October 6 asserted that "many press organs consider the agreement reached between Washington and Madrid as moral support by the US Department of State for the Spanish Government."

As in most Soviet propaganda campaigns, there is a pro-forma quality to the diatribes. The Spanish trade mission in Moscow has gone on functioning normally, and its Soviet employees showed up for work on what Moscow had proclaimed as a day of European labor solidarity against the Franco government.

The predominant theme of Soviet commentary is that the executions strip the facade of liberalism from the Spanish government and show that its true, fascist, nature is unchanged. The Soviets have asserted that the Franco regime is incapable of evolving in a "liberal" or "democratic" way, but stop short of saying that such evolution would be impossible for Spain after Franco departs. If the Soviets are indeed arguing against the likelihood of evolutionary change, they could come into conflict with the Spanish Communist Party which, like the Italian party, believes in seeking power by legal means. In the last two years, as the end of the Franco era seemed to be approaching, the Soviets have sought to patch up relations with the independent-minded Spanish party.

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The signals from Moscow on this issue are mixed. In an article in the latest edition of the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *New Times*, a Spanish Civil War exile, now a Soviet citizen, refers optimistically to the prospects for slow and bloodless change in Spain. Publication of the article may have been intended as a gesture to the Spanish party.

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EC Delegation Holds Talks in Bucharest

An EC commission delegation is in Bucharest to discuss a bilateral textile agreement.

These are the first negotiations between the EC commission and an individual CEMA member since the Soviets began pressing for an overall EC-CEMA relationship almost two years ago. Romania and Hungary indicated to the EC last spring that they were willing to negotiate a textile agreement in the context of the International Multilateral Fiber Agreement that each has signed.

25X1 [redacted] the Romanians also want to use the current talks to discuss a broad range of trade issues, outside the CEMA context and without any Soviet participation. Thirty percent of Romania's trade is already with the EC, and Bucharest is eager to increase this figure. The Romanians may press for loans and credits at favorable rates as well as increased industrial cooperation, including joint ventures in Romania. [redacted]

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25X1 The timing of the EC-Romanian textile negotiations--just before the planned CEMA summit next month--underscores Bucharest's determination to pursue and expand bilateral ties with the EC. Deputy Premier Patan recently asserted, in fact, that such contacts could proceed without waiting for the conclusion of a CEMA-EC general accord. The Soviets, however, prefer to have the general accord precede bilateral contacts. Moscow apparently also wants a more comprehensive agreement than does Bucharest [redacted]

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Personnel Changes in the
Czechoslovak Party Secretariat

A plenum of the party Central Committee early this week released Oldrich Svetska from his post on the secretariat and appointed him editor-in-chief of the party daily, *Rude Pravo*, a post he held from 1958 to 1968. Josef Havlin, currently the Czech minister of education, was elected to replace Svetska as party secretary.

These shifts presage a tougher ideological line in Czechoslovakia. Both men are veteran hard liners. Havlin, who staunchly supported ousted party boss Novotny and adopted a particularly tough line toward restive students in 1967, was dropped from all offices during the Dubcek era. Like Svetska, he has had previous press experience, and will not hesitate to crack the ideological whip in the regime's drive to have the media more closely reflect the view from the Kremlin. The Husak leadership has--since mid-summer--criticized "numerous problems and shortcomings" in the country's printed media [redacted] and Prague recently relieved the more moderate Miroslav Moc from his post of editor-in-chief of the party daily.

The Central Committee approved a letter to party organizations on preparations for the 15th party congress next April. Party chief Husak described the note as "an important ideological-political document." The plenum also approved a report to the Presidium on the further development of agriculture and the food industry.

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Iranian Prime Minister Visits Bulgaria

Agreements on economic and scientific cooperation highlighted the visit by Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda to Bulgaria last week. The talks continued the periodic exchange of high-level visits between the two countries--the last being by party chief Zhivkov to Iran in 1974.

The visit received low-key coverage in the Bulgarian press. The joint communique published on October 6 contained little of interest, and few details on the agreements were released. The talks did, however, carry forward Bulgaria's effort to expand its surface transportation network and industry. Iran agreed to purchase railroad passenger and freight cars, and Bulgaria's director of freight car manufacturing plants will visit Iran in the near future for further talks. The Bulgarians will also increase their exports of meat, cheese, butter, and other foodstuffs.

25X1 [redacted] one of the main subjects of discussion was the improvement of surface transportation through Bulgaria to facilitate shipments to Iran. Both countries still confront the Turkish bottleneck separating them. Turkey's limited rail capacity has contributed to endemic rail congestion at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Sofia has been trying--with little success--to persuade the Turks to take some cooperative action on their side of the border.

The communique did not mention the question of oil. As the US embassy points out, however, the subject certainly is of more than passing interest to the Bulgarians, especially if there is any prospect that they could obtain it on concessional terms. [redacted]

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